American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain
Theses and Dissertations

Student Research

2-1-2014

Do arbitrators have a duty to report corruption? Maybe . . . Maybe
Not
Hussain Alobaidi

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds

Recommended Citation

APA Citation
Alobaidi, H. (2014).Do arbitrators have a duty to report corruption? Maybe . . . Maybe Not [Master's Thesis,
the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/868

MLA Citation
Alobaidi, Hussain. Do arbitrators have a duty to report corruption? Maybe . . . Maybe Not. 2014. American
University in Cairo, Master's Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/868

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge
Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC
Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact thesisadmin@aucegypt.edu.

The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

DO ARBITRATORS HAVE A DUTY TO REPORT CORRUPTION?
MAYBE . . . MAYBE NOT

A Thesis Submitted to the

Department of Law

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for
LL. M. Degree in International and Comparative Law

By

Hussain Ahmad Hassan Alobaidi

December 2014

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

DO ARBITRATORS HAVE A DUTY TO REPORT CORRUPTION?
MAYBE . . . MAYBE NOT
A Thesis Submitted by
Hussain Ahmad Hassan Alobaidi
to the Department of Law
December 2014
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the L.L.M. Degree in International and Comparative Law
has been approved by the committee composed of
Professor Hani Sayed ____________________________
Thesis Supervisor
American University in Cairo
Date_______________

Professor John Matouk_______________
Thesis First Reader
American University in Cairo
Date_______________

Professor Gianluca P. Parolin _______________
Thesis Second Reader
American University in Cairo
Date_______________

Professor Hani Sayed ___________________________________
Law Department Chair
Date__________________

Ambassador Nabil Fahmy _______________________________
Dean of GAPP
Date__________________
ii

DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to my parents, brothers and sisters,
especially Abdullah, Narcissus & my fiancée Hala
for supporting me all the way.
Thank you.

iii

AKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Diana Van Bogaret and Dr. Hani Sayed for their
guidance and support over the past years.
I would like also to thank Dr. Soad Alsharkawi for what she has taught me
since 2006.
I would like to thank Ms. Amani Khalifa & Dr. Karim Hafez who allowed
me to enter his law firm and use its amazing library.
I would like to say that I am indebted to all my friends, especially
Dr. Sayed Shaarawy, Hassan Mohamd, Hamdi Beckhit, Hussain Ali, Mosab
Seraj and Abdullah Alhaddad.
Thank you to all my friends and family for your love and support.

iv

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Department of Law

ABSTRACT
This paper explores whether arbitrators’ have a duty to report corruption or not. It is
divided into two parts. In part one, the paper presents the legal status of arbitrators by
introducing the contractual, judicial and hybrid theories. Also, it examines the
national laws of the US, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to establish whether there is a legal
duty to report or not. In the second part, the paper defines both confidentiality and
public policy, and shows where the conflict between the two exists. On the one hand,
arbitrators have a duty to protect confidentiality. On the other hand, arbitrators have a
duty to insure the award will be enforced and that the contract does not contradict
public policy. With this in mind, the paper will present five cases where the
competent governments knew about the corruption, yet they did not prosecute the
perpetrators. The paper concludes with the contention that arbitrators have no legal
duty to report corruption.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Introduction …………………………………………………….…………..

1

II.

Arbitration and Crimes: the Interplay of Public & Private Law and Nature
of Arbitrator's Legal Status ………………………………………..

4

A. Contractual Theory ………………………………………………………...

5

B. Judicial Theory …………………………………………………………….. 10
1. Common Law – The USA ………..………………………………..

14

2. Civil Law – Egypt ………………………..………………………...

15

3. Saudi Arabia ………………………………..……………………… 16
C. Hybrid Theory ……………………………………………………………... 17
III.

Conflict between Confidentiality, Mandatory Rules and Public Policy …...

20

A. Definition of Confidentiality ………………………………………………. 20
1. Definition of Confidentiality in the AAA, UNCITRAL, LCIA &
WIPO ………………………………………………………………

20

2. Classical Definition of Confidentiality, the UK Courts, and the
Modern Definition, the Australian Courts …………………………

23

B. Definition of Public Policy and Some Application ………………………... 25
1. Public Policy Levels ……………………………………………….

26

2. Application of the Public Policy Content ………………………….

30

a) UK Case Law ………………………………………………

30

b) US Case Law ………………………………………………. 32
C. Confidentiality vs. Public Policy: Arbitrators' Duty to Report Crimes ……

34

1. ICC & ICSID Case Law: Arbitrators & Corruption ……………….

34

2. Scholars and Arbitrators' Duty before Corruption …………………

39

3. Arbitrators Duty to Report Crimes: Balancing between
Confidentiality & Public Policy …………………………………… 42
IV.

Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………... 46
vi

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963, Judge Lagergren created precedent in the international commercial arbitration (ICA)
field by finding a corrupt contract null and void. Judge Lagergren contended that “such
corruption is an international evil; it is contrary to good morals and . . . the community of
nations.”1 Since then, many contracts have been found null and void due to corruption. In
2006, for instance, about half a century later, the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) continued to recognize its dangers:
The Tribunal notes that, in some of these cases, it was alleged that
corruption is widespread either within the purchasing country or in the
particular sector of activity. However, all arbitral tribunals concluded that
such facts do no alter in any way the legal consequences dictated by the
prohibition of corruption (see ICC case no 1110 paras. 19-20; ICC case no
3916, Yves Derains -Collection of ICC awards 1974-1985 - Kluwer 1990
- p. 509; ICC case no 8891 - Journal du droit international 2000 no 4 p.
1083)… [t]he present Tribunal agrees with such conclusion.2
This thesis is a case study of arbitrators’ duty to report crime/corruption. In international
commercial arbitration, corruption arises in a variety of contexts.3 The first one is the
corruption of an arbitrator.4 For example, an arbitrator might ask for a bribe to adjudicate a
corrupt contract. The second context is corruption in disputes that arise out of contracts where
the real purpose of the contract is to bribe public officials. The third is when a contract is
signed by bribing public officials such as in the Lagergren case. In the last two forms,
arbitrators have three options. They can refuse to arbitrate. They can also report
corruption/crime to competent courts and attorney generals, or arbitrators can accept the
arbitration. If an arbitrator favours confidentiality, he/she refuses to arbitrate; therefore, the
private interests of parties prevail over public interests. Moreover, if an arbitrator reports
corruption, in favour of public policy, he/she will breach confidentiality and the contractual
relationship with parties. Finally, if an arbitrator accepts to arbitrate, he/she will participate in
a crime unless he/she decides the contract is null and void.

1

ICC Award No. 1110 of 1963 by Gunnar Lagergren, Trans-Lex, at 10, available at http://www.translex.org/201110/pdf/ (last Retrieved Oct 26, 2014).
2
World Duty Free Co Ltd v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, at 48, available at
http://www.trans-lex.org/241400/highlight_Kenya/ (last retrieved Oct 27, 2014).
3
Id, at 340.
4
The corruption of arbitrators will not be discussed in this paper, but the duty of arbitrators to report corrupted
contracts.

Courts and legal scholars focus on three issues when discussing the obligation of arbitrators’
duty to report corruption. These issues are confidentiality, public policy and the arbitrators’
role without neglecting the nature of the crime in the ICA.
Confidentiality is one of the important advantages of the ICA.5 It is considered the most vital
principle in the ICA process. Confidentiality protects the privacy of parties' documents and
interests. It has two definitions. The first definition provides parties with full confidentiality,
and allows the private interests to prevail over the public interests. This definition of
confidentiality is called the classical one by Hunter and Redfern. 6 The second and modern
definition provides parties with confidentiality as long as their interests do not contradict with
the public one.7 Each definition can drive the legal policy of states into two different
directions. Although confidentiality protects parties’ commercial secrets, it is double-edged.
Unfortunately some parties misuse confidentiality to cover corruption. For example, parties
may ask arbitrators for a consent award, which allows unlawful payment to settle the dispute
instead of going through the full process of arbitration, or they might appoint a weak defence
to lose a dispute such as in Himpurna vs. PLN.8
In addition to confidentiality, public policy plays a great role in arbitration at the national and
international levels. At the national level, a competent court will not accept awards that
conflict with an essential public policy. At the international level, there are general principles
agreed to by members of the international community which details unacceptable behaviour
such as laundering money. According to such differentiation, public policy has three levels
which states might utilize to prevent corruption. These levels are national public policy,
international public policy and transnational public policy. Public policy is an important
instrument by which the ICA can restrict corruption.
While some parties promote absolute confidentiality as a great advantage of the ICA, others
fight for public policy by which states might restrict the misuse of confidentiality by parties.
The former group thinks confidentiality secures their commercial interests while the latter
group believes absolute confidentiality might be manipulated by parties to cover crimes. As a

5

Some scholars think that the ICA has lost some of its advantages such as the length of time and expanses with
the increasing and complexity of disputes. See, N. Blackaby, C. Partasides, A. Redfern & M. Hunter, Redfern
and Hunter on International Arbitration, at 35-36, Oxford University Press, 2009.
6
Id, at 137-138.
7
Id.
8
Priyatna Abdurrasyid, They Said I was going to be Kidnapped, Mealey’s International Arbitration Report, Vol.
18, No. 6, June 2003.
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result of the tension between these two points of view, there has been an increase in debate
about confidentiality and public policy. The point of conflict regarding confidentiality falls in
the tangle of public and private interests. Merchants and corporations favour a wider scope of
confidentiality to protect commercial secrets, while governments prefer controlling
confidentiality to prevent corruption.
Finally, the arbitrators' role in the ICA is another issue discussed while looking at the
obligation of arbitrators to report crime/corruption. The privacy right directs people to
appoint arbitrators who are trusted and have a limited role in how the dispute will be settled.
According to the ICA, the two parties appoint one arbitrator together, or each party in a
commercial dispute appoints one arbitrator each who with his/her counterpart appoints a third
person to form a tribunal. The tribunal settles the dispute via investigating documents,
witnesses and commercial secrets. In such a process, the importance of a trusted arbitrator's
role appears. If such secrets are disclosed, reputations, commerce, or the competitive position
of parties can be damaged. Furthermore, arbitrators must be assured that the award can be
enforced by states. Therefore, the role of arbitrators exists amid a conflict zone. On the one
hand, there is a contractual relationship between the clients and the arbitrators not to disclose
information about the tribunal. On the other hand, there is an interest for the competent states
in which the award will be enforced to prevent any kind of corruption via public policy.
This paper is divided into three parts to show the duty of arbitrators in the case of corruption.
Part one gives background about the problem of corruption that international arbitrators deal
with. It also explores the legal status of arbitrators by presenting the legal theories of
arbitration.

Part two defines confidentiality. It gives an idea of past definitions of

confidentiality which have been articulated by the English courts. Furthermore, it presents the
definition of confidentiality of the Australian courts, considered the new school. Part two
presents ideas about mandatory laws and public policy to show the intersection between the
public and private interests in confidentiality. The third and last part balances public policy
with confidentiality. To do so, the chapter presents five examples of ICC & ICSID case law.
Furthermore, it presents the ideas of scholars regarding the duty of arbitrators to report
crimes. Such ideas elaborate the obstacles that legislators, courts, and scholars encounter
while dealing with arbitration in cases of corruption. It concludes with the paper’s contention
that arbitrators’ have no duty to report corruption.

3

II. Arbitration and Crimes: the Interplay of Public & Private Law and Nature of
Arbitrators’ Legal Status
Although countries abandon some of their power to international arbitrators to settle disputes
and facilitate international trade, countries and arbitrators observe that arbitration is misused
to cover and facilitate criminal activity. Corruption exists within the scope of criminal law
which is a part of public law. Many countries look at criminal law as a mark of their
sovereignty. Some argue that criminal law, as a branch of public law, and arbitration law, as a
part of private law, conflict in international commercial arbitration in cases of corruption.
Arbitrators have only a duty to settle commercial disputes, yet they witness criminal activities
while adjudicating. In addition, they have to decide whether a contract is null and void as part
of their duty to settle disputes within private law or international private law. Allowing
arbitrators to report corruption, once they discover it, would be considered as providing
foreign arbitrators with extra power to apply public national laws.
Moreover, reporting corruption influences the confidentiality of arbitrators before parties
which is against fair trial. Once arbitrators report corruption, they will be in favor of one of
the parties who does not want to abide by corrupted agreement known by parties. In this
option, arbitrators could be considered as violators for the arbitration agreement which must
be followed to keep confidential information. Reporting crime is a controversial issue among
scholars. For example, Hwang and Chung believe that arbitrators have a duty to report
corruption9 while others think there is an ethical duty to report but not a legal one.

10

As

arbitrators participate in the growth of international commerce and the economic welfare of
countries, arbitrators should prevent corruption by reporting it to authorities.11 Indeed, there
is a legal ambiguity in arbitrators' duty to report crimes.
However, both opinions depend on the legal status of arbitrators in the ICA. Some might
think that debates about the nature of the arbitrators’ job are a kind of theoretical debate, yet
it can be seen that the practical life of the ICA raises many problems in the case of corruption
such as the arbitrators' role, the limits of their powers, their obligations and their duties which

9

Michael Hwang & Kevin Lim, Corruption in Arbitration— Law and Reality, International Council for
Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), 2011-2012, available at http://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/0/13261720320840/corruption_in_arbitration_paper_draft_248.pdf (last retrieved Nov 25, 2013),
at 47-50.
10
Alexis Mourre, Arbitration and Criminal Law: Reflections on the Duties of the Arbitrator, Journal of
International Arbitration, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2006, at 95-97.
11
Michael Hwang & Kevin Lim, Supra note 9, at 47-50.
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are all affected by the legal status of arbitrators.12 Arbitrators who follow contractual theory
think there is no obligation to report corrupt contracts but to issue the nullity of contract while
others who follow the judicial theory might think there is an obligation if national laws
contain that. There are three theories to interpret the nature of arbitrators' job. Each one
provides arbitrators with different kind of powers, obligations and duties. Furthermore, the
three theories create different legal status for arbitrators, parties, and awards.
To sum up, this chapter discusses three theories of arbitration to elaborate the legal position
occupied by arbitrators in the ICA. It begins with contractual theory, followed by
jurisdictional theory, and concludes with hybrid theory.
A. Contractual Theory
According to the contractual theory, arbitration is based on the will of the parties as expressed
in the arbitration agreement.13 The proponents of the theory look at the nature of arbitration
from a contractual view. If there is no agreement, there is no arbitration. They assume that
there is a trilateral contract which is created between parties and an arbitrator when he/she
accepts to arbitrate. According to proponents of this theory, states do not have any kind of
jurisdictional power over the parties' will although the law of states might fill gaps in the
contract by referring to and interpreting the parties’ will.

Parties are free to choose laws

which control arbitration procedures, time and place without a state’s intervention. Although
some proponents believe that parties' desire may be controlled by the public policy of states,
they think that "pacta sunt servanda should prevail without pressure of state."14 This can be
seen in Kellor's opinion:
[A]rbitration is wholly voluntary in character. The contract of which the
arbitration clause is a part is a voluntary agreement. No law requires the
parties to make such a contract, nor does it give one party power to impose
it on another. When such an arbitration agreement is made part of the
principal contract, the parties voluntarily forgo established rights in favour
of what they deem to be the greater advantages of arbitration.36
Accordingly, with the exceptions of arbitrability and public policy which
are reserved for the lex fori, the lex fori has very little influence over the
procedures and outcome of the arbitration. Moreover, it has been
12

Obaid Saqer Busit, the System of Arbitration in the A.U.E: Problems and Prospects, Durham thesis, Durham
University, 1991, at 38, available at http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1508/ (last retrieved April 24, 2014).
13
Hong-Lin Yu, A Theoretical Overview of the Foundations of International Commercial Arbitration, 1 (2)
Contemp. Asia Arb. J. 255, 2008, at 265, available at
http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/center/wto/project/admin/SharePics/A_01_05%20pp%20255_Hong%20Lin%20Yu.pdf (last retrieved April 23, 2014).
14
Id, at 266.
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concluded that “national arbitration laws are only to supplement and fill
lacunae in the parties’ agreement as to the arbitration proceedings and to
provide a code capable of regulating the conduct of an arbitration.15
The contractual theory appears in many English and old French decisions. In England, for
example, there is Cereals S.A. v. Tradax Export S.A. where the court held that there is a
contract between parties and arbitrators as long as this contract meets requirements of the
public policy of states.16 In addition to the English decision, the French cassation court held
in many old decisions that the arbitration institutions do not have the character of being
public but private, and they do not have the character of continuity.17 As a result, the judicial
nature of arbitration does not exist. This means arbitration institutions must be a public
sector, and have the continuity charter as courts to obtain the judicial nature. In another
decision, the French cassation court stated that awards of tribunals had the character of an
agreement, so the award, which depends on the arbitration agreement, possesses the same
nature as the contract.18 Therefore, the award of arbitrators is restricted to the will of the
parties.
The arbitration agreement, as a contract, is controlled by private law as the other kinds of
contracts. Accordingly, the proponents of contractual theory consider the nature of the
arbitrators' job as being a contractual job and not a judicial one. 19 In a comparison between
judges and arbitrators, the proponents consider arbitrators not to be state judges. Therefore,
arbitrators can refuse to adjudicate disputes without being punished in contrast to state
judges. Moreover, arbitrators might be engineers, lawyers, or merchants, but judges must be
public officials.20

15

Id.
Id.
17
As mentioned in Huda Mohammad Majdi Abdul Rahman, Dour il-mohakim fi khsomat al-Tahkim wa hodood
soltatih, al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Nahdạh al-ʻArabīyah, 1997, at 26. (the Arbitrator's Role in the dispute of arbitration
and limits of his Power), Dar al-Nahadah al-Arabiyah, 1997, at 30. Also, in 1812, the French Cassation Court
had decided that the arbitration has the contractual feature from the beginning, signing the contract, to the end,
issuing the award. Although the Appeal Court of Paris, in 1901, had decided that the arbitration is a judicial
work and the award has a judicial characteristic, the French Cassation Court had refused that in 1914 and 1928.
It had decided the arbitration is an agreement. See Mahmud al-Sharqawi, al-Tahḳīm al-tijārī al-dawlī: dirāsah
mokarana, “Intenational Commercail Arbitration: a Comparative Study," dar al-Nahda al-Arbia, Cairo, 2013, at
13.
18
Id, at 30.
19
Pieter Sanders, Arbitration, v. XVI, 1996, J.C.B. MOHR(PAUL SIEBECK), TURBINGEN, MARTINUS
NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS, DORDECHT, BOSTON, LANCASTER, at 5-7; proponents of contractual theory
varies in determining .
20
Id, at 30.
16
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Although the proponents of contractual theory agree that arbitrators are not judges, their
opinions vary in determining arbitrators' legal status in the ICA. The range of scholars’
opinions hinges on the way in which they view the nature of the contractual relationship
between arbitrators and parties. Some scholars, such as Merlin and Foelix, think that the
arbitrator plays a role similar to that of an agent.21 They qualify the arbitration agreement as
an agency contract. According to Foleix, the arbitrator’s job is of a private nature not a public
one.22 The arbitrator works for parties' interests such as the work of an agent for the
principle.23 However, some proponents do not agree with that point of view. They believe
that arbitrators play a role as contractors.24 According to them, agents cannot represent
parties with conflicting interests. Finally, in terms of the award, the supporters consider the
award as having a contractual nature. Consequently, the award can be challenged before
national courts, and needs an executive order from national courts to be enforced such as with
a foreign verdict.
Although the contractual theory has many proponents whether in academic fields or judicial
systems, the theory has been criticized for many reasons. First of all, the theory concentrates
on the parties' will which is not enough to create the system of arbitration. For instance, the
theory cannot explain the awards having the authority of the res judicata.25 Furthermore, the
theory can explain the nature of voluntary arbitration depending on the will of the parties, but
it cannot explain the nature of obligatory arbitration which depends on national laws. 26 Some
states, for instance, oblige parties to settle some disputes via arbitration. Second, the theory
cannot explain the legal status of arbitrators as an agent. The agent must work for the benefit
of the principle while the arbitrator adjudicates in favour of one party over the other, or
against both parties.27 Also, the arbitrator cannot be an agent for two parties because that
would constitute a conflict of interest. In the agent theory, the agent must work for the benefit
of the principle. Otherwise, the agent might be prosecuted by the principle for damaging the
Mukhtar Ahmad Briri, al-Tahḳīm al-tijārī al-dawlī: dirāsah khāsṣạh lil-qānūn al-misṛī al-jadīd bi-shaʼn altahḳīm fī al-mawād al-madanīyah wa-al-tijārīyah, al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Nahdạh al-ʻArabīyah, 1995, at 7-8.
22
Hong-Lin Yu Supra note 13, at 268.
23
Id.
24
Id & Mostafa Al-Jammal & Okasha Abdula'al, al-Tahkim fi al-elakat al-khasa al-dawlia wa-al-dakhlia,
Alexandria, 1998, at 597. "Arbitration in private international and national relations," Alexandria, 1998, at 597.
25
Article 55 provides that [a]rbitral awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of the present Law have
the authority of the res judicata and shall be enforceable in conformity with the provisions of this Law, the
Egyptian Arbitration Law, Law No. 27/1994, available at http://www.crcica.org.eg/LawNo271994.pdf (last
retrieved 1 Aug 2014).
26
For example, article 57 of Egyptian Customs law forces owners of goods in case of disputes to arbitrate, Law
No. 66, 1963, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8343 (last retrieved 1Aug, 2014) &
Mahmud al-Sharqawi Supra note 17, at 15.
27
Hong-Lin Yu Supra note 13, at 268 & Huda Supra note 17, at 31-32.
21
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interests of the principle. Yet, the arbitrator is not prosecuted once he/she adjudicate against
the parties’ interests, the principles. Furthermore, the arbitrator must be financially
independent from parties which does not exist in the agent’s legal status.28 If the arbitrator is
independent financially, he/she will adjudicate impartially and independent, without being in
favour of one party over the other. Finally, the contractual theory does not provide any kind
of explanation for the immunity of arbitrators which is guaranteed by many legal systems
such as the UK and the US.29 Immunity is assured for arbitrators despite the existence of the
arbitration agreement. For instance, the English House of Lords indicated in Sutcliffe v.
Thackrah and Others Respondents that arbitrators enjoy the immunity same as judges:
It is well settled that judges, barristers, solicitors, jurors and witnesses
enjoy an absolute immunity from any form of civil action being brought
against them in respect of anything they say or do in court during the
course of a trial….since arbitrators are in much the same position as
judges, in that they carry out more or less the same functions, the law has
for generations recognized [sic] that public policy requires that they too
shall be accorded the immunity to which I have referred.30
Some scholars have tried to invent a new theory which they call the autonomous theory.
According to its proponents, the autonomous theory refuses to favour the approaches of
contractual and judicial theories to describe the nature of arbitration. It also rejects the hybrid
theory for its unlimited application. The autonomous theory regards at the arbitration from a
practical perspective.31 It tries to characterize the nature of arbitration according to its goals
which are the flexibility and speed in settling disputes. In other words, supporters of the
theory want scholars to consider arbitration as an instrument to achieve social and economic
goals of international trade. Consequently, the use and purpose of arbitration is the real
description of arbitration’s nature and not national laws. Rubellin-Devichi, who invented the
theory, believes that the arbitration has a private and autonomous nature which is different
from other theories.32
The autonomous theory provides a solution for settling disputes away from classical justice
such as national rules and official courts where international trade finds obstacles such as the
length of times and difficult legal systems. Consequently, Rubellin-Devichi believes that
28

Id.
Id.
30
[1974] A.C. 727, at 757-758, available at http://www.trans-lex.org/311320 (last retrieved Oct 23, 2014).
31
Hong-Lin Yu, Supra note 13, at 278. See Jacqueline Rybellin-Devichi, L'arbitrage Nature Juridique Droit
Interne Et Droit International Prive, Paris, 1965 & Philipe Fauchard, Le Statut de L'arbitre dans la jurisprudence
Francaise de l'arbitrage, 1996, 235 ets.
32
Hong-Lin Yu, at 278.
29
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arbitration has its own legal system where the will of parties is autonomous. Parties can
nominate any kind of law to adjudicate disputes whether national law, international law,
general principles of international laws, good sense or lex mercatoia.33 Proponents of the
theory have invented what they call supra-national law which is a characteristic of
international commercial arbitration. Supra-national law means that arbitration has its own
law which must not be restricted to municipal laws or international laws. Parties themselves
decide what laws are suitable for disputes on international trade. According to the theory,
parties have an absolute autonomy to formulate rules that control subjective and objectives
issues without the interference of states.34 Such autonomy will enhance the development of
the ICA and its functioning parallel to international trade. 35 States where the award is
enforced or arbitration exists do not have a supervisory power over the arbitration, awards or
parties’ autonomy. States’ job, according to that, is only to enforce the award. As a result,
awards can be enforced in all countries without objection, which is called delocalization.36
For instance, in Soleimany vs. Soliemany, parties chose Jewish law to be applied to the
dispute even though it was void in the English court. The latter refused arbitration because
the contract is against public policy.37
Although the theory has been supported by many scholars, others find that the autonomous
theory does not provide a new explanation for the ICA and the power of arbitrators. 38 The
theory states that the contractual theory does not describe the nature of arbitration when
calling it a contract only, and the judicial theory limits arbitration to a judicial work only
which are familiar to scholars.39 Furthermore, the theory states that it is not suitable for the
general rules of procedural laws to be applied to arbitration disputes. This might be
acceptable in the cases of legislative vacuum, but in case the legislator formulates rules to
manage arbitration procedure, such as in Egypt, arbitration might be considered as a judicial
instrument similar as courts.40 Moreover, it is hard to accept the absolute autonomy of
parties' will without the supervisory power of states. Such an idea allows some merchants,
companies and states to breach the public policy of weak and corrupted states.

33

Id, at 280-281.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
This issue will be discussed in-depth later on the public policy subdivision.
38
Huda, supra note 17, at 39.
39
Id.
40
Id.
34
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To sum up, it seems from the above that the autonomous theory is same as the contractual
theory. Both theories are based on pacta sunt servanda, or the will of the parties. In my
opinion, there is no need for such a distinction; the autonomous theory is the contractual
theory. Therefore, arbitrators’ duty in both theories is only to apply the parties’ will. In the
contractual theory, whether arbitrators’ have a duty to report corruption or not, arbitrators do
not have a legal duty to report corruption whether they are considered as agents, or
contractors. If arbitrators are considered as agents, they do not have to report corruption. The
agent agreement is controlled by the will of the parties. It cannot be imagined that the
principle will provide the agent with power to report the principle’s corruption. Furthermore,
the agency agreement depends on the trust between the principle and the agent. Therefore, it
can be said that there is no agency rules in any states that discuss the duty of agents to report
corruption.
Moreover, if arbitrators are regarded as contractors, they do not have a duty to report
corruption. The contractor is, for example, a person or company that is chosen to supply
materials for construction works while the arbitrator is a person who is chosen to settle
disputes between conflicting interests. As a result, in all national laws, arbitrators are not
considered contractors. Yet, if arbitrators are regarded as contractors, it is hard to find a duty
to report corruption on contractors in many national codes.
Furthermore, in autonomous theory or modern contractual theory, it can be said that
arbitrators do not have a duty to report corruption. The autonomous theory provides parties
only with the power in the ICA without giving states any supervisory power. If there is a
crime/corruption, states do not need to be involved because international trade has its own
means to solve the problem.
B. The Judicial Theory
The second theory is the judicial theory which is also known as the delegation theory.
Judicial theory does not neglect the will of parties as a first step in creating the arbitration, yet
it does not ignore the contractual theory whereby the arbitration is described as possessing a
contractual nature. On the contrary, the judicial theory looks at arbitration as a judicial
instrument although it needs parties' will to begin. According to the theory, arbitrators settle
disputes between parties, and issue verdicts that are res judicata.41 The arbitrators' mission is
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the essence of judicial work. Judicial work has three components which exist in arbitration.42
Those components are a claim, a dispute and a person who has legal power to settle the
dispute.43 Moreover, proponents contend that states have supervisory power over arbitration
despite the will of the parties. According to jurisdicationalists,

states, where arbitration is

suited or where the award is enforced, provide arbitrators with power to play a judicial role,
which is called the delegation theory.44 According to the delegation theory, states have the
exclusive right to manage their jurisdiction, and it is a feature of sovereignty. Therefore,
states can transfer some of their prerogatives to any institution or individuals, such as the
arbitrator:
[t]he state alone has the right to administer justice, so that if the law allows
the parties to submit to arbitration, this institution could be exercising a
public function, from which, logically, it must be concluded that the award
is a judgment in the same sense as the decision rendered by a judge of the
state.45
The same approach can be seen in a judgment of the Egyptian Cassation Court which
concludes that the courts only have the right to adjudicate disputes as a general rule, yet there
is an exception where the legislator provides parties with permission to settle disputes by
arbitration:
Even though, in general, the right to adjudicate disputes is restricted to
courts, article 15, Law No. 46, 1972, the Egyptian legislator permits
parties, as an exception in article 501-1 & 502-3, to have an arbitration
agreement by which parties will nominate arbitrators. Those arbitrators
will adjudicate disputes, and issue awards that have the same nature of
verdicts of courts. 46
Moreover, some supporters contend that arbitrators and judges practice the same judicial
work although arbitrators are chosen by parties not states. One of the proponents states that
"[t]he arbitration process, is judicial in the sense that it is the process of jurisdiction
conducted by a judge. That the judge is private judge does not affect the essentiality
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jurisdictional charter of the mechanism and operation."47 Proponents add that "arbitrators are
viewed as judges contractual chosen, performing functions assuming analogous to those of
judges substitutes for state and similar responsibilities."48 Indeed, the process of choosing
arbitrators by parties instead of states does not make any difference in the judicial process of
arbitration. The arbitration agreement should not drive scholars to neglect the essential goal
of arbitration which is adjudicating disputes. Consequently, the theory demands all aspects of
the arbitration process, time and limitations of arbitrators' power to be regulated by national
laws which are chosen by parties, or the seat of law.49 According to the proponents,
arbitrators have the power to adjudicate within the parties' will which must not breach
mandatory rules and public policy of national law:
[i]n other words, the various issues arising from international commercial
arbitration, such as the validity of the arbitration agreement, the arbitral
procedures, the arbitrator’s power, the scope of submission and the
enforceability of arbitral awards, have to be decided within the mandatory
rules and public policy of the lex fori.50
The jurisdictional theory finds its support where national courts practice a supervisory role
over arbitration. For example, when national courts, where the award will be enforced or
where the arbitration takes place, fill the gap in parties' arbitration agreement. The New York
Convention (NYC) recognizes the right of national courts to practice supervisory power over
the arbitration. The NYC in article V (2) (a) and (b) states that:
2. [r]ecognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused
if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that: (a) [t]he subject matter of the difference
is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country, or
(b) [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary 10 the
public policy of that country.51
The application of supervisory power of national courts, article V of the NYC, can be seen in
many cases such as the American Safety Equipment Corp. v. JP Maguire Co.52 In this case,
the courts refused the will of the parties to settle the dispute which includes a claim under
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anti-trust law by the arbitration. The court states that "[a] claim under the anti-trust laws is
not merely a private matter… [w]e don’t believe Congress intended such claims to be
resolved elsewhere than the courts."53 As a result, proponents believe that the arbitrator’s
legal status is quasi-judicial. Arbitrators resemble judges by the laws of states, and therefore,
they must observe public policy and mandatory rules.54 Moreover, supporters argue that
while judges are provided with power to settle disputes and are nominated directly by states,
the nomination of arbitrators is a matter of parties.55 Consequently, from the proponents'
point of view of the jurisdictional theory, arbitrators exercise a judicial power.

However, the legal status of arbitrators and ad hoc arbitration has been criticized by some
contractualists. In terms of legal status, they reject the similarity of arbitrators’ job to judges.
According to them, arbitrators do not have the power to create judicial precedent in the
absence of rules while judges have. Also, on the ad hoc arbitration, some scholars state that
the ad hoc arbitration has a contractual nature while institutional arbitration has a judicial
basis. To some supporters of the judicial theory, both criticisms can be refuted. First,
although arbitrators do not have the power to create precedents, they do have power to
adjudicate within rules that already exist. If arbitrators lack some powers, this does not mean
their job is not judicial work. Even the power of national judges is limited which does not
deny the nature of their work as a judicial. For instance, some judges do not have power to
adjudicate criminal disputes but civil or commercial disputes. Second, there is no point in
differentiating between ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration. They both are
instruments to settle disputes.
All in all, the judicial theory proposes that states have supervisory power over arbitration, as
a private jurisdiction. Yet some wonder again if arbitrators, as private judges with limited
power, have an obligation to report crimes according to the theory. In my opinion, the
question should be answered by looking at the national rules. If there are clear rules about
such an obligation, then arbitrators have to report. If there are no rules, it will be hard to put
more obligations on arbitrators than what they recognize or afford. Therefore, national laws
are the only instrument to show if arbitrators have a duty to report crimes or not according to
the judicial theory. A focus on three sets of national laws from three different legal systems
which are the US as a common law, Egypt as a civil law and Saudi Arabia as a Sharia law
53
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system illustrate how national laws impact on arbitrators’ duty to report corruption according
to judicial theory.
1. Common Law - the U.S.A
The American corporations have international commercial relationships all over the world.
Also, American courts have an influence over international arbitration as many awards are
enforced in America. In a step to restrict corruption, the US has formulated many rules to
combat corruption. It started with the Foreign Corrupt Practice Acts (FCPA) of 1977 to
prevent American companies and individuals from bribing foreign public officials to gain
business.56 The FCPA criminalizes unlawful acts by foreigners or citizens while acting
within American territory.57 Although the FCPA does not mention any kind of duty to report
corruption whether by citizens or experts, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
rewards a blower whistle or blowers whistle 10 to 30 % of the collected sanction. 58 The
reward is given to those who voluntarily inform the SEC about of breaches of the FCPA
which leads to a monetary sanction beyond $ 1 million USD.59 Such a step may help to
eliminate corruption; although reporting is required, it is "not imposed."60
In addition to the FCPA, the American legislator has formulated the Annunzio-Wylie Act to
combat money laundering. The Annunzio-While act requires customers and insiders to
report any "suspected violation of Federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a money
laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act."61 Unlike the Annunzio-While act
which requires a minimum amount, $ 5,000 in some cases, to be reported, the Patriot Act of
2001 extends the duty of reporting to financial businesses.62 Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 requires auditors and attorneys to report any suspicious business of their
clients.63 However, in this cases, the SEC demands that a private attorney to have credible
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evidence to report.64 Indeed, the current rules do not cover international arbitrators for many
reasons. First, the American rules cover specific professionals without referring to arbitrators
by name. Second, the rules are extended beyond American citizens to crimes committed by
anyone within American territory. In the US then, there are no legal obligations upon the
arbitrators to report crimes.
2. Civil Law - Egypt
Unlike in the U.S common law system, the civil law system in Egypt depends more on codes.
Under the Egyptian Penal Code, there is a vacuum legislation to fight corruption, bribery, on
the international level.65 For example, the Egyptian Penal Code does not provide a clear
article that criminalizes bribing foreign officials. Furthermore, "many Egyptians government
officials enjoy immunity from prosecution."66 It will not be possible to prosecute public
officials while they are in their positions. However, article 47 (a) of criminal procedure code
presents an optional obligation to report corruption:
[a]ny person….who learns that an offence has been committed in respect
of which proceedings have been instituted without a complaint being
submitted….may inform the investigative judge or the [judicial]
investigator or the Public Prosecution or any police station.67
The article, indeed, asks citizens but for optional report. The Egyptian procedural code
distinguishes between citizens and public servants. While there is no obligation on citizens to
report crimes, article 48 of the code sets a legal duty on any public servant to inform the
competent power:
[a]ny public servant who, in the course of performing his duties or as a
consequence of performing his duties, learns that an offence has been committed
or suspects that an offence has been committed...must immediately inform one of
the persons specified in Article 47.68

In Egypt, the legislator does not clarify the legal status of arbitrators, whether or not they are
considered as public servants.
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Nevertheless, the situation in dealing with anti-money laundering law is much easier. Article
8 of the Anti-Money laundering law asks financial institutions to report money laundering
and suspect acts. Such a duty does not cover any individual but rather financial institutions
and those who work in them. The article states that "[f]inancial institutions shall report to the
[u]nit financial transactions suspected of involving money laundering or terrorism
financing."69 Therefore, it can be said that in Egypt, there is no obligation on arbitrators to
report money laundering.
3. Saudi Arabia
Unfortunately, the Criminal Procedural Code of Saudi Arabia does not provide any
obligation to report crimes nor the Penal Code. It seems the legislator does not give an
attention to the issue of reporting corruption obligation. Yet, article 17 of the Saudi antibribery law rewards every informer that leads to the catching or help in catching criminals:
[e]very informer who gives information regarding an offence,…., be
granted a reward of not less than 5,000 Rials and not exceeding one half
of the confiscated property… but the Ministry of Interior may pay a sum
higher than the sum which would be fixed in pursuance of this Article,
subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers.70
Although the anti-bribery law does not include any mention of reporting crimes, it is
appropriate to discuss the idea of reporting crimes from the perspective of Shari'a law, Hisba,
enjoying good and forbidding wrong,71 as long as Shari’a fills the vacuum legislation in
Saudi legal system . For instance, article 1 of Saudi constitution states that "God's Book and
the Sunnah of His Prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution."72
Article 23 of the constitution restricts the power of Hisba to the state only which seems
incompatible with Shari'a. Article 23 provides that "[t]he state protects Islam; it implements
its Shari'ah; it orders people to do right and shun evil; it fulfils the duty regarding God's
69
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call."73 Although arbitrators are not public officials according to Saudi arbitration law, they
can participate in forbidding the wrong, or Hisba, as long as arbitrators are regarded as
scholars. Shari'a provides not only the state with power of Hisba, commanding right and
forbidding wrong, but also scholars. Yet, Saudi law does not oblige citizens to report bribery
nor arbitrators. The Saudi anti-money laundering law, also, does not place a duty on citizens
and arbitrators to report money laundering, only financial entities and its workers are required
to do so.74
C. Hybrid Theory:
The third theory which is called the hybrid theory is a mix of the both theories, contractual
and judicial. Some scholars have tried to avoid the criticism of the contractual theory of
arbitration by describing arbitration as having a combination of judicial and contractual
nature. According to the hybrid theory, arbitration takes a position amid the theories that is
comprised of both a consensual solution for disputes and a judicial one.75 Arbitration starts
with the will of the parties, a contractual nature, and it ends with an award that settles the
dispute. Yet, the award will not take the judicial nature as a judgment until the award gains
executive power.76 Otherwise, the award will not have the power of res judicata.
Many legal systems and scholars prefer the hybrid theory. For instance, article 21 of the old
Saudi arbitration law reflects the hybrid theory in dealing with the award; it considers the
award by arbitrators after receiving the executive order as same as the judgment made by the
courts that have issued the order.77 In other word, awards have executive power is considered
as national verdicts. Moreover, some scholars consider arbitration as a kind of solution
which reconciles contradictory interests. The interest of parties which exist in the free will
and the interest of states which exists in public policy. Therefore, using the hybrid theory to
describe the nature of arbitration avoids the criticisms of both contractual and judicial
theorists. Many scholars, arbitrators and judges take the hybrid theory seriously. Redfern and
Hunter, for instance, states that arbitration has hybrid nature:
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[i]nternational commercial arbitration is a hybrid. It begins as a private
agreement between the parties. It continues by way of private proceedings,
in which the wishes of the parties are of great importance. Yet it ends with
an award which has binding legal force and effect and which, on
appropriate conditions being met, the courts of most countries of the world
will be prepared to recognize [sic] and enforce. The private process has a
public effect, implemented by the support of the public authorities of each
state expressed through its national law.78
According to the theory, both the desires of the parties and the states play a role in shaping
the nature of arbitration, and thus in shaping the legal status of arbitrators. On the one hand,
arbitration cannot be created without the will of parties; on the other hand, the process and
enforcement of awards cannot contradict the mandatory rules or public policy of states.
Concerning the legal status of arbitrators, arbitrators have a contractual relationship with
parties.79 The parties nominate the arbitrator who is best able to settle their dispute, and
arbitrators derive their power from the parties’ agreement, arbitration agreement. Yet, the
power of arbitrators is restricted to the mandatory rules and public policy of enforcing
states.80 According to the hybrid theory, arbitrators have a contractual relationship with the
parties similar to the contractual theory, yet arbitrators must adhere to public policy and the
mandatory rules of states similar to the judicial theory.
Although the hybrid theory has many supporters, it has been criticized for combining both
theories. Regarding the award, the theory states that the award will be consider as a verdict if
it has execution order. Such a result contradicts the idea of arbitration which depends on the
optional enforcement of the award as long as it is not against public policy or arbitrability
rules.81 Furthermore, some question if the award does not have the order of execution,
whether it will be considered as a verdict which contradicts delocalization theory. Some
scholars criticize the hybrid theory for its description of arbitration as it starts with an
agreement and ends with a judicial award. Yet, the theory does not describe the essence of
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arbitration which is an instrument to settle disputes.82 Moreover, some scholars believe that
the hybrid theory describes the nature of optional arbitration, but it does not describe the
nature of obligatory arbitration such as that found in article 57 of Egyptian Customs law.83
In my opinion, obligatory arbitration is an exception for the general rule of arbitration which
is optional. Obligatory arbitration, which some countries prefer in some commercial disputes,
reflects the will of the government to solve disputes via arbitration. While in optional
arbitration parties sign arbitration agreement before or after disputes raise, parties in
obligatory arbitration knows from the beginning that disputes arising from the contracts will
be settled by arbitration. Therefore, I think the hybrid theory describes both kinds of
arbitration whether obligatory or optional.

It is known that the hybrid theory consists of the judicial and contractual theories, yet some
wonder what about arbitrators' obligation to report corruption? Is there an obligation? Within
the hybrid theory, the arbitrators' legal status is regarded as a contractual. There is a
contractual relationship between parties and arbitrators. Parties nominate arbitrators to settle
disputes by the authorization of the parties and within the chosen rules. Furthermore,
arbitrators must not breach public policy and the mandatory rules of states.84 Under the
hybrid theory it is hard to say whether there is an obligation to report crimes as long as there
are no clear rules by states.85
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III. Conflict between Confidentiality, Mandatory Rules, and Public Policy86
In this chapter, the paper discusses the conflict of interests between confidentiality and
public policy. First part defines the meaning of confidentiality in the ICA, and its scope.
This will give background about the importance of confidentiality. Second part defines
public policy and its levels with some cases to show its importance in arbitration, and why
there is controversy about whether to restrict it in favour of public interest, public policy or
not. Such a step presents many problems which arise because of the difference of
confidentiality between theory and practice.87
A. Definition of Confidentiality
Confidentiality can be defined as an obligation that prohibits parties, plaintiffs, defendants or
arbitrators, from disclosing information or documents which have a relation to the
arbitration.88 Any materials, testimonies or sessions are confidential. Yet, some international
arbitration institutions and courts have their own definition of confidentiality. This part
discusses the variation in the scope of confidentiality in some arbitration rules like LCIA and
WIPO. Some institutions expand the definition to cover almost everything in favour of
parties' interests, while others restrict it to balance the interest of states and parties.
1. Definition of Confidentiality in the AAA, UNCITRAL, LCIA and WIPO:
In this part, the paper presents the meaning of confidentiality in international rules to show
that the scope of confidentiality is restricted or broadened upon international rules. Although
many parties think that confidentiality separates their business from the public sphere which
is mostly true, some international institutions do not regulate confidentiality related to
arbitration. In the UNCITRAL, for example, confidentiality is not mentioned at all while
some national rules, such as the Serbian rules of the foreign trade attached to the Trade
86
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Chamber, cover only the confidentiality of hearings.89 International rules of arbitral
institutions and national laws deal with confidentiality in various ways. The London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA) formulates confidentiality as a general principle; the LCIA
expands it to the award, documents and all materials that are related to the arbitration in
article 30 (1).90 Furthermore, the article states there is an exception to confidentiality in states
of legal duty.91 In some circumstances, for instance, national courts might order to disclose
materials to give executive power to the award. Furthermore, in notes for arbitrators in the
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) India, note fourteen explains that article 30
of the LCIA India, which is similar to the original article 30 in the LCIA, "imposes duties of
confidentiality on parties and arbitrators."92 Consequently, no parties and arbitrators have the
right to disclose material or information that is created for the purpose of arbitration unless
parties agree to the disclosure.

Article 30 of LCIA India requires the same duty as the arbitrators of the LCIA with the same
exceptions, which is the legal duty. Yet, the article does not give a concrete answer to
whether arbitrators have a duty to report crimes, corruption, or not. Article 30 mentions
specific type of legal duty:
Unless the parties expressly agree … disclosure may be required of a party
by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or to enforce or challenge
an award in bona fide legal proceedings before a court or other judicial
authority.93
Furthermore, the arbitration rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) state a duty to the arbitrators not to discourse materials related to the
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arbitration in the article 6 (2), and extend confidentiality to the award.94 Also, the arbitration
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) do not present more than a general
principle of confidentiality.95 The articles do not give any kind of duty of to report crimes.
They restrict the work of ICC to commercial disputes. Article 1 (2) details the work of the
ICC court to administer the resolutions of tribunals not to resolve disputes.96 Moreover, the
commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) presents
confidentiality as a general principle to all matters related to the arbitration and award "unless
agreed to by parties or applicable law."97 Yet, the AAA goes further and supplies the
arbitrator with a right to inform the AAA of any circumstances, such as personal financial
interest, that may influence the impartiality.98 Although such opportunity is optional, it is
ignored if parties or arbitrators fail to inform, or they pursue the tribunal. 99 The AAA paves a
way showing the duties of arbitrators by creating an ethical code for them. For example,
canon I (A) states "[a]n arbitrator….should recognize a responsibility to the public, to the
parties whose rights will be decided, and to all other participants in the proceeding. This
responsibility may include pro bono service as an arbitrator where appropriate."100 By
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analysing this article, the reader may think there is an ethical duty to report corruption, or at
least prevent corruption by issuing the nullity of contract regarding to pro bono services.
Additionally, arbitration rules of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
covers, indeed, confidentiality in the existence of arbitration, documents used or generated,
arbitrators, witnesses, and award.101 In other words, the WIPO knows the importance of
documents especially in the commercial field; therefore, it covers all issues that can damage
parties’ interests. Finally, as some scholars believe, parties should be aware that
confidentially does not apply to all arbitration, and there is variation extending confidentiality
to the whole process of arbitration.102 The variation in defining confidentiality and its scope
are flexible because many states want their jurisdictions to play a role in times of conflict
between private interest and public policy. The flexibility in the meaning of confidentiality
enhances the power of national courts to prevent the privilege of private interest over public
one.
2. Classical Definition of Confidentiality, the UK Courts, and the Modern Definition,
the Australian Courts
In the beginning, the paper discusses the meaning and scope of confidentiality in the English
case law and Australian case law. Such a step presents an idea about the variation in
understanding the scope of confidentiality among different legal systems.
While many international institutions for arbitration fail to give a clear theoretical answer to
the concept of confidentiality and duty to disclose, many international courts provide a
solution to the problem on a case by case basis. There are two juridical trends in defining
confidentiality and its limits which are the classical school and the modern school. The
jurisdiction of the classical school is represented by courts under English law, and the
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jurisdiction of the modern school is presented by the Australian court.103 In the English court,
for example, in Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel v. Mew, the court believed that there is
privacy in a hearing which extends to an implied duty of confidentiality in the ICA; the
English court, Judge Colman, stated that the documents must be confidential as long as the
hearings are held in private according to the arbitration agreement:
If it be correct that there is at least an implied term in every agreement to
arbitrate that the hearing shall be held in private, the requirement of
privacy must be in principal extend to documents which are created for the
purpose of that hearing.104
Moreover, in Ali Shipping Corp v Shipyard Trogir, the English court reinforced its position
regarding confidentiality. The Court of Appeal declared that confidentiality is implied, by
law, to pleadings, proof of evidence, hearings and awards:
Held, allowing the appeal, that a term of confidentiality was implied by
law not only to the award itself but also to pleadings, submissions and
proofs of evidence. Confidentiality was subject to exception in the case of
consent, in the interests of justice, or where it was reasonably necessary
for the protection of the interests of a party to the arbitration. Injunctive
relief should be available except in the case of fraud or abuse of process
even if it might result in a tactical advantage to one party.105
Unlike the classical school which believes that all materials in an arbitration must not be
disclosed to support parties in another one, the modern school tries to balance public interest
with the principle of confidentiality. The courts of the modern school believe that public
interest prevails over confidentiality, so if materials related to an arbitration are important for
public interest, parties can ask to disclose the materials in another arbitration process. The
Australian High Court, for instance, in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v. The Honourable
Sidney James Plowman, stated that documents are not confidential as a result of hearings
confidentiality; absolute confidentiality is not a principle of international arbitration in
Australia, and disclosing documents must prevail over confidentiality in favour of public
interests:
When one party produces documents or discloses information to an
opposing party in an arbitration that is to be heard in private, the
documents or information are not clothed with confidentiality merely
because of the privacy of the hearing. Nor does the use of a document in
such proceedings make the document confidential. Absolute confidentiality
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of documents produced and information disclosed in an arbitration is not
a characteristic of arbitrations in Australia. Accordingly, a party who
enters into an arbitration agreement is not taken merely on that account to
have contracted to keep absolutely confidential all documents produced
and information disclosed to that party by another party in the
arbitration…although the privacy of hearing should be respected,
confidentiality was not an essential attribute of a private arbitration…the
public's legitimate interest in obtaining information about affairs of public
authorities prevailed.106
In another case, Commonwealth of Australia v Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd, the Australian
Court of Appeal refused to apply the agreement of parties not to disclose confidential
material, yet it asked that materials be disclosed in favour of public policy to protect the
environment:
In the course of a lengthy commercial arbitration between the parties, the
arbitrator made directions that documents prepared for the purposes of the
arbitration or documents which would reveal the contents of the same, not
be disclosed. The Commonwealth wished to disclose certain of those
documents to the Environment Protection Authority of New South Wales,
and they were also the subject of a request by a journalist under
the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The Commonwealth sought
by summons to set aside the arbitrator's directions as being beyond power.
The trial judge dismissed the summons, holding that the Court had no
power to intervene in the arbitration proceedings.107
Although the English courts affirm confidentiality, and they believe that the ideal is to
achieve the interest of justice, they do not mention the duty of arbitrators in the case of
serving justice. They present a general duty to reveal information to help in supporting
justice. They do not declare whether arbitrators have the right to play such a role or not.
Similarly, the Australian Appeal Court does not cite the duty of arbitrators to release
information though the appeal courts prefer public interest over the right of confidentiality.
B. Definition of Public Policy and Some Application
In this part, the paper will shed light on the public policies levels (1). It will, also, present
some examples of the application content of public policy at contempt courts (2), and it will
provide some example of disputes in which public policy was invoked by parties or
arbitrators and how do they deal with.
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Public policy is a vague and complex term that has evolved over time. What was accepted in
the 20th century in a state may not be accepted in the 21st century in the same state.108 Also,
public policy can differ among states around the world. For instance, an award which is
issued as a result of a dispute concerning alcoholic beverages may be challenged in Saudi
Arabia while the award might not be in a different state. In other words, "public policy is a
variable notion that is open-textured and flexible."109 Public policy is an essential factor for
an award to be enforced by states. Article V (2) of (b) of the New York Convention provides
"[r]ecognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (b) [t]he
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country."110
1. Public Policy Levels
There are three levels of public policy: national public policy, international public policy and
transnational public policy.111 At the national level, public policy reflects essential principles
of state policy in social, economic, religious, political, legal and moral domains.112 Some
scholars define it as "a dynamic concept that evolves continually to meet the changing needs
of society, including political, cultural, moral and economical dimensions."113 Some states,
for instance, might find that disputes related to anti-trust law are not arbitrable in one time but
are arbitrable in the future.114 Furthermore, public policy is defined as the representing of
national standards and mandatory laws that can't be changed or derogated by parties.115
Therefore, domestic mandatory rules embody a part of national public policy while not
international public policy. For instance, article 6 of the French Penal Code provides
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"[s]tatutes relating to public policy and morals may not be derogated from by private
agreements."116 Morals are of a vague nature that evolves in public policies of different
states. In case of corruption, for instance, some might think arbitrators duty to report
corruption is kind of moral obligation while others think not. Another example is the ad hoc
award of 1989 where a claimant, a Panamanian company, filed a case against a respondent, a
Swiss company.

The tribunal found that brokerage is not prohibited under Swiss law

although brokerage is prohibited under foreign public law. Yet, it is not prohibited for
arbitrators sitting in Switzerland and applying Swiss law.117 Consequently, national courts
may decide the nullity of awards as long as the awards contradict with the national public
policy of states. Some scholars think that article V (2) b deals with the negative public policy
by which competent courts refuse to enforce awards against public policy.118 Nevertheless,
national public policy is applied narrowly, by many industrialized countries, in favour of
liberalizing international trade.119 In Parsons & Whittemore, for instance, the latter did not
complete the construction of a paperboard mill in Egypt because of the Arab-Israel Six Day
War. They claimed that applying the award in favour of the Egyptian Company, Societe
Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), was against U.S public policy as long as the
US had cut all types of relations including diplomatic. Parsons & Whittemore argued that as
"a loyal citizen" they refused to complete the construction. Persons & Whittemore argued to
define national public policy of the US through international politics. The Second Circuit
rejected the definition of public policy by the appellant:
[i]n equating 'national' policy with United States 'public' policy, the
appellant [Parsons & Whittemore] quite plainly misses the mark. To read
the public policy defence as a parochial device protective of national
political interests would seriously undermine the Convention's utility. This
provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of international politics
under the rubric of 'public policy.'120
At the international level, international public policy consists of a narrower level of public
policy or, in other words, domestic public policy. The principles of international public policy
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reflect the fundamental principles of the legal order in a concerned state.121 For example, the
Second Circuit of the US Appeal Court refused to apply US public policy instead of
international public policy. The court stated that "[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral awards
may be denied…only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions
of morality and justice."122 The fundamental principles cover international treaties, morals,
natural laws, international customs that are accepted by the international community such as
justice, pacta sunt servanda, and contra bona more.123 In Eco Swiss China Limited v
Benetton Investment NV, for example, the tribunal which was seated in the Netherlands
adjudicated against Benetton for terminating the exclusive right by which Eco Swiss was
given the right to sell clocks which bears the name of 'Benetton by Bulova, in Europe. Yet,
the award was challenged before a Dutch court by Benetton contending that the exclusive
licensing agreement was anti-competitive under article 81 of the EC treaty, which reflects a
part of international public policy. The Dutch court adjudicated in favour of Benetton, stating
that an award which enforces an agreement of exclusive licensing is against public policy.124
Advocate General Saggio stated before the ECJ that the Dutch court has the right to annul
any award that contradicts with the EC competition laws on the grounds of public policy.
According to some scholars, if international public policy is breached, parties will be
prevented from invoking a foreign law, foreign verdict, or foreign award.125

The

International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration's (ILA)
gives a similar definition of the international public policy. According to the report of the
ILA, international public policy of any state consists of:
(i) fundamental principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the State
wishes to protect even when it is not directly concerned; (ii) rules designed
to serve the essential political, social, or economic interests of the State,
these being known as "lois de police" or "public policy rules"; and (iii) the
duty of the State to respect its obligations towards other States or
international organizations (e.g., through international treaties.126
In addition to domestic and international public policies, there is a third level of public policy
which is transnational public policy. Transnational public policy is more uniform than the
121
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international one, and was a narrower scope.127 Transnational public policy is also regarded
as the truly international public policy.128 According to some scholars, transnational public
policy "involves the identification of principles that are commonly recognized by political
and legal systems around the world."129 Others believe that transnational public policy is not
only about fundamental values of human beings in "a specific society," but, about the values
that are accepted by the international community.130 The values must be supported by treaties
and international declarations; otherwise, the values will not be recognized as transnational
public policy.131 Transnational public policy, for instance, includes: (i) human rights
principles on both civil and political levels; and (ii) protecting ethical values recognized by
the international community.132 Moreover, there is a group who define transnational public
policy as a reflection of the "societas mercatroum."133 According to this point of view, the
society of merchants has their own values at the international level which are utilized to
enhance fair international trade. Such values which concern international trade by merchants
are accepted universally, and they include ethical principles that exist in international
commerce and regarded as supranational.134 Consequently, fighting corruption is a part of
transactional public policy because it enhances fair trade at the international level. For this
reason, for example, Judge Lagergren stated that bribery is condemned in both French and
Algerian jurisdictions. Furthermore, he contended that "bribery is contrary to good morals
and to an international public policy common to the community of nations."135
To sum up, the domestic level of public policy is wider than the international one, and the
international one is wider than the transnational one. Domestic public policy might not be
applied at the international level as long as it is not regarded as a part of international public
policy. Furthermore, international public policy is accepted by many states, yet it is not
considered as a part being of transnational public policy if it is not accepted universally.
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2. Application of Public Policy Content
The levels of public policy and the way that courts of different legal systems apply is
reflected in cases in which public policy is invoked according to article V (2) b of the NY.
Conv. 1958. While there is no data in Egyptian and Saudi Arabian case law, 136 there are
examples in UK and the US case law. It should be noticed, at the outset, that the UK and US
are seen as industrialized countries which means they rarely refuse to enforce awards on the
grounds of public policy.137 They are considered as countries with a pro-enforcement bias of
awards. Furthermore, the jurisdictions of both countries influence international arbitration
and arbitral law globally.138
a) UK Case Law
England plays a great role in international commerce, and it is a place where many awards
are enforced. The English laws and courts have a stamp on the ICA. Therefore, the English
case law presents a guide for the meaning of public policy. This part provides how public
policy is utilized in the UK case law.
The UK jurisdiction, a country with an industrialized approach, has its own understanding of
public policy. Such understanding varies among cases. What might be regarded as invoking
public policy in one case might not be suitable for other cases. The Soleimany v. Soleimany
and Westcare Investment, Inc. v. Jugoimport-SP-DR Holdings present clear examples of
verdicts in which different meanings and levels of public policy lead to different results.
In the first case, Soleimany v. Soleimany, there was a contract between a son, the plaintiff,
and his father, the defendant, to export Iranian carpets from Iran. Ding so is against Iranian
revenue law and export controls. The son breached Iranian law by exporting carpets to the
father by smuggling and bribing Iranian officials. Once the father sold the carpets in the UK
and other places, a dispute arose between the son and the father about the commission. They
both signed an arbitration agreement to settle the dispute using Jewish law, and asked the
Beth Din (Court of Chief Rabbi) to adjudicate. The Beth Din found that the contract was
illegal because it breached Iranian law, yet such an illegality did not affect the parties’ rights
according to Jewish law. The Beth Din issued an award in favor of the son to be paid £ 576,
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574 by the father. Nevertheless, when the court of appeal sought enforcement of the award, it
held that the award cannot be enforced for breaching public policy of a friendly foreign state:
[w]here a foreign arbitration award was made pursuant to a valid
arbitration agreement but was based on a contract which was illegal under
the law of a friendly foreign state [emphases added] where that law
governed the contract or the contract was to be performed in that state, the
English court would not enforce that award on the grounds of public
policy.139
Thus, even illegality according to a foreign mandatory law can establish grounds for setting
aside the award. The English High Court of Appeal issued that breaching the law of a
friendly foreign state would not be tolerated.
However, in the second case, Westacre Investment, Inc. v. Jugoimport-SP-DR Holdings, the
English court compared two levels of public policy to reach a different decision than the
Soleimany v. Soleimany verdict. The first one of public policy supports the finality of the
arbitral award reflecting a pro-enforcement bias while the second level of public policy
fought illegal contracts.
In this case, the dispute arose out of a Consultancy Agreement between the Panamanian
company, Westacre, on one side and the state Yugoslavian company, Jugoimport, on the
other. Jugoimport appointed Westacre as a counsellor to sell weapons to the Kuwaiti Ministry
of Defence. Westacre would receive 15 % of the deal between the Kuwaiti Ministry and
Jugoimport. Nevertheless, Jugoimport terminated the contract with the Kuwaiti Ministry, and
did not pay the fees to Westacre. According to the arbitration agreement, the ICC obliged
Jugoimport to pay all outstanding fees to Westacre. The award was challenged by Jugoimport
in Switzerland, yet the Federal Swiss Tribunal upheld it. Jugoimport challenged the
enforcement of the award before the English court by alleging that there was no consultancy
contract with Westacre except a contract which included bribing Kuwaiti officials. According
to Jugoimport, paying a bribe to Kuwaiti officials to influence the Kuwaiti Ministry of
Defence was against Kuwaiti public policy. Therefore, the English court balanced public
policy which favoured enforcement of the award and the public policy which rejected
enforcement of the award in illegal contracts. The English court considered public policy of
the finality of the award:
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Against these considerations, it is necessary to take into account the
importance of sustaining the finality of international arbitration awards in
a jurisdiction which is the venue of more international arbitrations than
anywhere else in the world.140
The court had ruled on the side of commercial interests:
On balance, I have come to the conclusion that the public policy of
sustaining international arbitration awards on the facts of this case
outweighs the public policy in discouraging international commercial
corruption.141
The second decision of the English court reflects a pro-enforcement bias versus discouraging
corruption. This is in spite of the fact that the UK is a part of the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.142
b) US Case Law
The same point of view of the English courts regarding balancing foreign public policy and
mandatory rules can be observed American case law. The American courts, as in the English
courts, reflect a pro-enforcement bias even though an award might contradict foreign
mandatory laws or public policy. Many American cases provide examples of this approach
such as Northrorp Corporation. v. Triad International Marketing S.A. and LainiorsTrefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Company.
In Northrorp Corporation. v. Triad International Marketing S.A.,143 there was a contract in
the form of a , marketing agreement, in which Northrop asked Triad to be the exclusive agent
for marketing aircraft, maintenance services and equipment for the Saudi Air Force. In return,
Northrop would give a commission on sales to Triad.144

Northrop paid a part of the

commission to Triad, but it stopped the rest of the commission when the Council of Ministers
of Saudi Arabia issued Decree No. 1275 which prohibited pay commissions on military
contracts.145 The Decree was issued to prevent corruption and bribery on military contracts.146
A dispute arose as a result of the preventing of the rest of the commission. Northrop and
Triad had an agreement to settle disputes, related to the marketing agreement, according to
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paragraph 13 of the California law.147

Consequently, Triad obtained an award against

Northrop to be paid the rest of the commission. Although paragraph 13, also, mentioned that
"the award of a majority of the arbitrators…shall be final and binding upon the parties,"148
Northrop challenged the award on the ground that it was contrary to the public policy of
Saudi Arabia. The commission would breach the Saudi decree. Furthermore, the
Cal.Civ.Code 1511 prevents, as a matter of public policy, the enforcement of a contract that
contradicts a foreign state’s law.149 However, the California Court of Appeal rejected this
argument stating that the Decree of Saudi Arabia was made to prevent any additional costs on
Saudi procurement not on Northrop.150 Moreover, the payment of a sales commission is not
prohibited under California law. Therefore, the court of appeal held that Triad has the right to
the rest of its sales commission.
In Lainiors-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens (LTCL), S.A. v. Southwire Company,151 the federal
district court refused to apply the French mandatory rules for contradicting the domestic
public policy of the United States. The LCTA, a French manufacturer of steel wire and rope,
had signed a purchase agreement with Southwire, an American company for cable products,
to sell galvanized steel. The agreement had articles about disputes and interests. The first
article provided that disputes would be adjudicated by Georgia law to the extent they did not
contradict with French law. The second article stated that the price would be adjusted
according to the world market price of steel wire based on the “, world market price
adjustment clause."152 As a result of the dispute, both companies asked for arbitration to
interpret the world market price adjustment clause. The LTCL obtained an award against
Southwire, and moved to enforce it in Georgia. Consequently, Southwire opposed the
movement, and argued that the interest which was issued in the award according to French
law is against Georgia law. The Federal court demands that the public policy of the United
States be considered in this case. According to the court, the excess interest rate which is
accepted by French law is not accepted by the public policy of the United States. Therefore,
domestic public policy prevails over French mandatory law, and the rate of interest would be
decreased to be compatible with the rate that is accepted by Georgia law.
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C. Confidentiality vs. Public Policy - Arbitrators' Duty to Report Crimes
Before balancing confidentiality and public policy interests, it is an essential to provide some
examples of ICC & ICSID case law that deals with corruption. This will present an idea
about the situation in which arbitrators find themselves balancing public interests, public
policy, and private interests, confidentiality. Secondly, some opinions of scholars about
arbitrators' duty might clarify how they think about the duty of arbitrators before corruption.

1. ICC & ICSID Case Law: Arbitrators & Corruption
This part presents some practical examples of arbitrators’ role in case of corruption. Such
examples show the difficulties encountered by arbitrators in cases of corruption while
adjudicating such as the involvement of public officials, limited power and burden of proof.
In case of corruption, arbitrators might play a positive role by redressing corruption. 153 They
might, also, play a negative role by which they investigate whether or not the contract is
corrupt.154 As a result of arbitrators’ judicial works, many scholars have asked for affirmative
steps by arbitrators to report corruption.155 Yet, arbitrators have their own experience by
which they represent how they understand their duty, or mission, in case of corruption.
Therefore, it is an indispensable step to present some examples of arbitrators' behavior in the
face of corruption.156
ICC Case no. 1110 of 1963, is a dispute raised between the claimant, an Argentinean
engineer, and the defendant, a British Company. The defendant promised the claimant a 10 %
commission on a contract if the latter could influence Argentinean authorities to sign
contracts with the British company. The British company got one contract with the Argentine
authority, but the Argentine engineer did not get the 10 % as promised for his favour.
Therefore, they decided to settle the dispute via a tribunal. Although Judge Lagergren, the
sole arbitrator, agreed that in the Person regime, it was not possible to have an investment
contract without bribe public officials, he refused the jurisdiction over the corrupt contract:
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[D]uring the Peron regime everyone wishing to do business in the
Argentine was faced with the question of bribes…commissions to persons
in a position to influence or decide upon public awards of contracts seems
to have been more or less accepted or at least tolerated in the Argentine at
that time [emphasis added].157
Judge Lagergren added:
[A] case such as this, involving such gross violations of good morals and
international public policy, can have no countenance in any court either in
the Argentine or France or, for that matter, in any civilized country, nor in
any arbitral tribunal [emphasis added]. 158
Finally, he declared that he had no jurisdiction, and refused to participate in a corrupt act.
Judge Lagergren did not allow such an agreement between parties to be enforced in any
country.
Another example of arbitrators’ role in case of corruption is the ICC Case no. 3916 of 1982
where the claimant, a director of an Iranian department, asked a Greek company to pay the
Iranian director a 2 % of commission. In each contract the Greek company obtained from the
Iranian government. The defendant paid several commissions to the Iranian director until the
Iranian Revolution, of 1979, which ended the work of the Greek company in Iran. As a result,
the Greek company did not pay the rest of the commissions, for there were no new contracts
with the ex-Iranian government. The tribunal concluded that there was no chance of obtaining
a contract with the ex-Iranian government without bribery before 1979. Furthermore, the
Greek company had already paid commissions for contracts which had been obtained. As the
contract to pay a commission was against public policy in both France and England, the
contract was found to be null and void.159 Here, also, the tribunal refused to find the contract
legal that parties were looking for. The tribunal had stated that the commission for the
contracts covered bribery.

The third example of how arbitrators prevent corruption is ICC Case no. 5622. In its award of
August of 1982 and the second award of April 1992,160 OTV, a French company, wanted to
organize a tender requested by Algerian authority. Consequently, the French company signed
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a contract with Hilmarton, an English company, to give legal and fiscal advice to the former.
According to the contract, OTV would pay "4 % of the total amount of the primary
contract,"161 as a commission to Hilmarton, yet the French company paid only 2% of the
commission. Consequently, Hilmarton asked for arbitration. The arbitrator questioned
whether or not there was bribery. Consequently, he sought whether or not the contract was
against Algerian law which prohibited trafficking influence,162 international public policy or
Swiss public policy. The arbitrator found there was no bribery. Yet, he concluded the contract
to be null and void, for it breached Algerian law, which prohibited using intermediaries to
obtain contracts with public authorities. Furthermore, the contract breached moral standards
implicit in Swiss law because the contract violated a foreign law.163
On Nov 17, 1989, Hilmarton asked for an annulment of the award before the court of justice
of the canton of Geneva. The court found that the breach of foreign law did not imply a
breach of the moral standards of Swiss law. Moreover, the contract was arbitrary as long as it
did not suggest bribery. Moreover, both parties knew that Hilmarton would breach Algerian
law to obtain a contract. Therefore, the Swiss court stated that the award of the arbitrator was
null.164

In April 1992, Hilmarton resumed ICC arbitration under Swiss law. The first arbitrator was
replaced by another who reached the same conclusion as the Swiss court. The unusual aspect
is that the first award was in favour of OTV, the French company, enforced in France, and the
second award was in favour of Hilmarton, the English company, enforced in the UK.165
This case provides a clear example of the extent of arbitrators’ power, and how such power
might be neglected by international corporations which practice a kind of political economy.
Both companies belong to industrialized countries, and both of them intended to breach a
foreign mandatory rule of a developing country, Algeria. Furthermore, the British court
favored the interest of Hilmarton in the second award while the French court favored the
interest of OTV in the first award.
An additional example of arbitrators’ role is found in ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 of
September 2006. Here a dispute arose between World Duty Free Company Ltd (WDFC), the
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claimant, vs. the Republic of Kenya, the respondent. The claimant signed a contract with the
government of Kenya for construction, maintenance and operation of a duty-free complex at
Nairobi and Mombassa International airports in 1989. The contract was signed for 10 years
with an option for the company to renew the contract for another 10 years under the same
conditions. The WDFC obtained the contract by bribing the former president of Kenya, Mr.
Daniel arap Moi with $ 2 million USD. Furthermore, the WDFC provided many Kenyan
public officials with gifts. Yet, the Kenyan government did not respect the agreement, and
expropriated the WDFC which led to losses for the owners of the WDFC. The Kenyan
government rejected such claims, and responded by saying that the agreement was null for
bribing the former president. The tribunal stated that Kenyan government did not prosecute
the ex-president although he had left the position:
[m]oreover…the bribe was apparently solicited by the Kenyan president…
[who] has now left the office and is no longer immune from suit under
Kenyan constitution, it appears that no attempt has been made to prosecute
him for corruption or to recover the bribe in civil proceedings.166
The tribunal found that the agreement is null and void under the applicable law. Moreover,
the arbitrators presented a clear image that the contract was made by bribing public officials,
the president and others, yet the Kenyan government did not prosecute them although it had a
knowledge of the corruption. In this case, arbitrators chose to adjudicate the nullity of the
contract to prevent corruption from being a part of the international trade process.
In another and more recent ICSID case, Case No. ARB/10/3 of October 2013 between MetalTech Ltd, the claimant, vs. the Republic of Uzbekistan, the respondent, the tribunal decided
that it has no jurisdiction over the dispute under the BIT and Uzbek law because of
corruption.167 Metal-Tech had signed a joint venture agreement with Uzmetal Technology,
and two other Uzbekistani companies to produce and export molybdenum products. 168 On
the one side, Metal-Tech paid 50% of Uzmetal’s capital and contributed technology knowhow. Furthermore, Metal-Tech would provide access to the international market. On the other
side, the two Uzbekistani companies contributed the remaining 50% of Uzmetal
Technology’s capital. Furthermore, they would sell raw molybdenum exclusively to Uzmetal.
According to the agreement, Uzmetal Technology had no right to sell molybdenum products
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but to Metal-Tech. Furthermore, Metal-Tech had the exclusive right to sell the products in the
international market. In 2006, the public office of the Uzbekistani prosecutor started criminal
proceeding against officials of Uzmital who had abused their power and caused damage to
Uzbekistan.169 After a month, the Uzbekistani cabinet of ministers issued a resolution to
cancel the exclusive right of Uzmetal to purchase the raw molybdenum from Uzbekistani
companies. Subsequently, the Uzbekistani companies stopped contracts with Uzmital which
lead to the termination of Uzmital and its liquidation.170 After the failure of Metal-Tech’s
case before the Uzbekistani economic court, Metal-Tech, in 2010, filed a request to arbitrate
before the ICSID. The respondent argued that the tribunal had no jurisdiction under the BIT
and Uzbek law because the investment of the claimant was gained through corruption. 171
Indeed, Metal-Tech had paid $4 million USD to Uzbekistani public officials and consultants,
but it had failed to prove there were any services or consultancies. One of the consultants was
Mr. Sultanov who is the brother of the Uzbekistani prime minister. In the end, the tribunal
concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the dispute because of the lack of consent of
Uzbakistan according to article 8(1) of the BIT:
Uzbekistan’s consent to ICSID arbitration, as expressed in Article 8(1) of
the BIT, is restricted to disputes “concerning an investment.” Article 1(1)
of the BIT defines investments to mean only investments implemented in
compliance with local law. Accordingly, the present dispute does not come
within the reach of Article 8(1) and is not covered by Uzbekistan’s
consent. This means that this dispute does not meet the consent
requirement set in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Accordingly,
failing consent by the host state under the BIT and the ICSID Convention,
this Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over this dispute.172
In this case, the tribunal restricted its power to the contract between Metal-Tech and the
Republic of Uzbekistan.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the case of Himpurna California Energy and Pathua Power
Ltd. vs. a State Electric Power Company (PLN) and the Republic of Indonesia.173 This case
gives a real example where the arbitrator cannot report corrupting in the face of political
power of governments. In this case, Himpurna filed a claim against the PLN and the Republic
of Indonesia. Mr. Abdurrasyid, who was one of the three arbitrators, found that the contract
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between Himpurna, the PLN and the government of Indonesia had been procured by bribery.
Mr. Abdurrasyid was trying to invoke nullity of the contract before the tribunal, yet, he could
not. On the way to attend the session, Indonesian diplomats led by force Mr. Abdurrasyid to a
hotel in Amsterdam where the tribunal is set to prevent him not to attend the tribunal. 174 Such
a clear example shows what arbitrators might face if they think they will report corruption.
To sum up, in the cases above, the tribunals did not go beyond the rule of nullity and
voidance of the agreement contracts. Moreover, the ICC and ICSID do not have jurisdiction
over agreements that cannot be recognized under the applicable law according to the NY
Convention 1958. Arbitrators work with different laws whether chosen by parties or
international laws to prevent corruption. Yet, the power of tribunals to fight corruption is
restricted by the lack of national and international support. Such support is manipulated and
controlled by the political and economic interests of every country, developing and developed
countries alike.
2. Scholars and Arbitrators' Duty before Corruption
Although ICC and ICSID cases have proved that arbitrators play a great role in preventing
corruption to the extent that they can, law cases do not establish a precedent whereby
arbitrators report corruption. Therefore, some scholars have tried to answer whether
arbitrators have a legal duty to report corruption or not.
Redfern and Hunter, Alexis Mourre, and C.S.A Nasarre have written on arbitration and
crime. Redfern and Hunter think that the duty of arbitrators to report crimes is an ethical
obligation.175 According to them, arbitrators' duty is to solve disputes before them as the
arbitration agreement states.176 They think arbitrators, in suspected incidents of corruption,
have to ask parties to provide more documents to clarify whether there is a real dispute or
not.177 Yet, Redfren and Hunter do not mention obstacles that encounter arbitrators such as
parties may refuse to submit such documents under arguments of national interest or parties
may invoke legal professional privilege, for example.178 In the case of laundering money, the
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writers believe that arbitrators should set aside the dispute for there is no actual dispute.179
Redfren and Hunter, furthermore, believe that bribery, fraud and laundering money are
connected to each other in arbitration.180 They think that in case of corruption, there are, also,
crimes of bribery, laundering money or both and vice versa. So, when arbitrators and states
prevent one of them, they prevent the other crimes because in the existence of bribery there is
either fraud, laundering money or other kinds of corruption.
Alexis Mourre, in the article Arbitration and Criminal Law: Reflections on the Duties of the
Arbitrator, agrees with Redfern and Hunter that the ICA must not be an instrument for
guarding against corruption. He thinks that arbitration is a normal result of international
business disputes. Arbitrators must have power to fight corruption in international trade.
Arbitrators, in Mourre's opinion, are more experienced than judges to uncover crimes related
to disputes before them. As a result, states must give arbitrators a chance to participate in
discovering crimes more than judges. Unlike Redfern and Hunter who think arbitrators have
an ethical duty to report crimes, Alexis thinks arbitrators are the "natural judges to fight
crimes in international trade," and they have more than an ethical duty.181
Furthermore, McDougall in answering the question of arbitrators’ duty divides the question
into three parts. The first is whether international commercial arbitration has jurisdiction over
a dispute to decide if there is a crime or not. Second, if it does have a jurisdiction, whether the
tribunal should invoke international public policy to "hold invalid contract" Whether it
invokes the mandatory law.182 He proposes that the tribunal has a role in the dispute to
decide if there is crime or not, and it can refer to public international law and the mandatory
law to decide if the dispute is void. Nevertheless, McDougall does not give an answer to the
question of arbitrators' duty; he, furthermore, asks more questions such as to whom
arbitrators should report? And whether arbitrators should raise the crime as their motion?183
On the other hand, there are scholars who believe there is a legal duty on arbitrators to report
corruption, for instance, Michael Hwang and Kevin Lim. They think that the question must
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be answered at the national level. The issue of corruption must be resolved by national laws
in which members of the tribunals belong. So, arbitrators must, according to Hwang and Lim,
report crimes to the courts that are more related to the dispute, and they must be immune
from any legal consequences for their breach of the contractual relationship.184 They derive
the principle, that arbitrators must report crimes, from general rules that fight corruption and
money laundering in many countries. For example, article 25 of the Scottish Arbitration Bill
states that "(1) Disclosure by the tribunal, any arbitrator or a party of confidential information
relating to the arbitration is to be actionable as a breach of an obligation of confidence unless
the disclosure … (c) is required… (iii) in order to enable any public body or office-holder to
perform public functions properly, (e) is in the public interest, (f) is necessary in the interests
of justice.185 Furthermore, article 70 provides arbitrators with immunity for their actions
unless in bad faith.186 Although the opinion of Hwang and Lim can be recognized as one of
the most persuasive answers, it harms parties if arbitrators made a mistake by disclosing
confidential documents. Some scholars like Hwang and Lim would argue the disclosure is
committed in good faith, but this raises other issues. Here, some wonder if legislators favor
the good faith principle on confidential documents worth billions of dollars.
Moreover, in the article entitled, International Commercial Arbitration and Corruption: The
Role and Duties of the Arbitrator, Nasarre follows the same track of Lim and Hwang to
figure out the answer of arbitrators' duty in the case of crimes. He compares national laws,
such as the national laws of the UK and the US, and international conventions, like the Civil
Law Convention on Corruption, and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.187 He
concludes that most of the international conventions and jurisdictions do not embody more
than a general obligation; most of the articles are directed towards public officials.188
Consequently, he says that although arbitrators are not public officials and they can be
removed by parties, their mission has a public aspect which prevails over the contractual
relationship with parties. So, they have a duty to report crimes. In my opinion, if there is a
duty of arbitrators to report crimes, there must be rights for them to have limited immunity of
civil and criminal liability and protected from any insults by parties. On the one hand, they
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must feel immune in case of the disclosure of confidential documents. On the other hand,
they should recognize that they will not be immune in the case of bad faith. Such a balance
between protecting arbitrators and parties will restrict breaches of both.
However, there are some scholars who refuse to place an obligation on arbitrators to report
without a clear expression. Cremades and Carins say that "[s]uch a duty could only arise from
express legislation in a jurisdiction to which the arbitral tribunal, or some of its members,
were subject." 189 The same point has been concluded by a Working Group of the ICC. The
Working Group said that "it appeared contrary to the nature of arbitration, contrary in
particularly to the trust that parties place in the arbitrator, for an arbitral tribunal to report the
authorizes the offences found…"190 In my opinion, the Working Group favors confidentiality
over reporting crimes for three reasons. First, in international trade, confidentiality of parties
might privilege over national public policy. The working group might consider that no states
have claimed that they do not know about corruption. Second, arbitrators’ job is to settle
commercial disputes and issue nullity of corrupt contracts not to report corruption to states
know about it. Third, Reporting corruption by arbitrators might expose arbitrators to danger
such as Mr. Abdurrasyid.
3. Arbitrators Duty to Report Crimes: Balancing between Confidentiality & Public
Policy
Balancing between confidentiality and public policy at the domestic level might be easier
than on the international level. On the domestic level, public policy prevails over
confidentiality such as in the Esso Australia Resources Ltd v. The Honourable Sidney James
Plowman case where both parties were Australian nationals and the competent court was
Australian, too. If there was a case of corruption in a domestic arbitration, for example, the
duty of domestic arbitrators to report corruption is clear. Such a duty springs from general
rules, which deal with reporting crimes, national criminal laws, or national laws of arbitration
if they exist. For instance, article 434-1 of French Penal Code provides a general duty to
report crimes.191 Yet, on the international level, the situation is different and more complex.
First of all, arbitrators deal with different legal systems such as civil, common legal systems
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or Shari'a. Furthermore, arbitrators might neglect some mandatory laws of countries in favor
of other countries like in Northrorp Corporation. Vs. Triad International Marketing S.A.
Second, the nationality of arbitrators, nationality of parties, and locations of the tribunal and
enforcement influence the way in which arbitrators deal with corruption. For instance, if the
Scottish law obligates arbitrators to report corruption, what should arbitrators do if they do
not have the English nationality, parties with different nationalities, or corruption having
taken places in different places? The differences in nationality for parties, tribunals, and the
seat of tribunal influence, also, the verdicts of competent courts in enforcing the award or not.
Moreover, the legal status of arbitrators, which varies among legal systems influence his/her
power. For instance, Libyan law refers arbitration to contractual theory which means legal
background of Libyan arbitrators differ from the legal background of British arbitrators
whose English courts refers arbitration to the hybrid theory.192 Accordingly, arbitrators’ legal
background is likely to influence the way in which arbitrators look at corruption and the duty
to report it. For instance, in Soleimany, the Beth Din did not pay an attention to the illegal
contract, for the illegality of the contract according to the Iranian law is not considered in
Jewish law. Therefore, the Beth Din issued an award in favor of the son. Regardless of the
Jewish law, parties, in the autonomous theory, can choose any kind of laws whether positive
laws, natural laws, or general principals of law. If an arbitrator follows the autonomous
theory, s/he will not go beyond what the arbitrator reached using Jewish law, and would issue
a similar award. Third, the lack of laws, and sometimes unclear laws, restricts arbitrators'
power and their ability to deal with corruption. Finally, political economy and absence of
states political desire to fight corruption influence arbitrators' role. There have been, always,
a difference between developing and developed countries where the latter benefit from
corruption to the welfare of their economies. All of the above reasons and problems make it
difficult to oblige arbitrators to report corruption.
Some scholars might consider arbitrators to be the guardians of international trade, and it will
not be easy to say there is no obligation to report corruption. Yet, national courts do not
consider corruption if it does not impact interests of their countries. In Westacre, for example,
the English court found that the contract was illegal for bribing Kuwaiti officials according to
the facts before it, yet the court weighted between two public policies: the public policy of
the UK not to enforce illegal contracts and the public policy supporting the finality of the
award. In the end, the court preferred the latter public policy, and enforced the award. The
192

Mukhtar Ahmad Briri, Supra note 21, at 7-13, & Redfern & Hunter, Supra note 78, at 8.

43

English court tried to justify its decision in several ways. First, it stated that “[m]inisters and
government officials are in certain parts of the world customarily bribed to procure lucrative
contracts for the suppliers of arms and the providers of building and construction projects.”193
The English court was aware its award influence over the field of international arbitration.
Therefore, it refused to create a precedent by neglecting the principle of an award finality.
The court stated “[a]gainst these considerations it is necessary to take into account the
importance of sustaining the finality of international arbitration awards in the jurisdiction
which is the venue of more international arbitrations than anywhere else in the world.”194
Second, the court tried to highlight the graveness of the illegality of bribery by comparing it
with drug-trafficking to reach its decisions. It provided that “[n]o doubt, if it were proved that
the underlying contract was, in spite of all outward appearances, one involving drug
trafficking, the alleged offensiveness of the transactions would be such as to outweigh any
countervailing consideration. Where, however, the degree of offensiveness is as far down the
scare in the present case, I see no reason why the balance of policy should be against
enforcement.”195
The English court is aware of corruption dangers in transactions of international trade,
especially in third world countries. Yet, the court knows that it does not have the appropriate
instrument to report it. In brief, as in the WDFC vs. Republic of Kenya, the tribunal posited
that the ex-president had not been prosecuted by the Kenyan government although the
government knew about the corruption. Furthermore, in Himpurna California Energy Ltd. vs.
Perusahaan Listruik Negara (PLN), Mr. Priyatana Abdurrasyid who was an Indonesian
arbitrator prevented by force by the Indonesian government from attending the tribunal, for
he had intended to invoke the corruption of the contract. He stated that
I tried to argue that the condition of PLN then, actually resulted from a
contract drawn up through KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism),
where the foreign counterpart was required to hand over a portion of its
shares to certain party in Indonesia without any payment of even one cent.
Thus, in my opinion, this case out to be handed over to the office of
Attorney General for investigation. It was found out later on, however,
that the Indonesian party disagreed, because the KKN issue involved
various officials of the Republic of Indonesia, and would be revealed in
the open. The President at that time was Habibie [emphasis added].196
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In the former case, an Indonesian arbitrator intended to report the General Attorney, yet the
whole government was against him, and he was not able to protect either himself or his
family. How can arbitrators have an obligation to report without being able to protect his
family? In my opinion, corruption in international commerce cannot exist without the
knowledge of the government. For all of these reasons, I think confidentiality should prevail
and arbitrators do not have a duty to report corruption in the absence of political will.
Moreover, deciding the nullity and voidness of the contract is registered in the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC). Therefore, the competent states can have knowledge of corruption, and
invoke corruption by states more appropriately than the reporting of corruption by arbitrators.
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IV. Conclusion

Corruption is a wide spread phenomena. It exists mostly in every aspect of life and especially
in the international trade where political economy has its great role. Arbitration, which is an
instrument to settle disputes, has countered many disputes that include corruption. The
precedents of ICC and ICSID show that once arbitrators counter illegal contracts, they always
issue the nullity and void of contract. The reaction of arbitrators regarding illegal acts is
exposed to debates among scholars. While some of them believe that arbitrators’ job does not
end with issuing the nullity and void of contracts, but with reporting corruption, others think
that there is no legal duty to do so.
Yet, to answer whether there is a legal duty to report corruption or not, scholars and courts
need first to clarify the legal status of arbitrators. Indeed, arbitrators’ role is influenced by the
nature of arbitration. There are many legal theories to describe the nature of arbitration, and
each one provides parties, arbitrators, and states with restricted or expanded power. While the
contract theory provides arbitrators with power to settle disputes within the scope of
contracts, and look at arbitrators as agents, or contractors, the judicial theory consider
arbitrators as judges but chosen by parties not states. Moreover, the hybrid theory and
autonomous theory have their views regarding arbitrators’ legal status which differ from the
latter theories.
The variety of theories which might be followed by different legal systems and arbitrators
would drive to different answers for arbitrators’ duty to report in the ICA. The different
answer for arbitrator’s’ duty to report corruption is enhanced by the fact that there is a
vacuum legislation in both national and international levels. For example, the OECD antibribery, the European Convention on Corruption, and legislators of the US, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia do not present a legal obligation on arbitrators to report. Such a vacuum drives legal
scholars, arbitrators and courts to find their own answer. While scholars from civil legal
systems might support arbitrates to report corruption, scholars from common legal systems
might not. Moreover, the answer would differ among those who come from industrialized
countries and those from consumer states.
Indeed, with the vagueness in arbitrators’ duty to report or not, arbitrators have to balance
between two conflicted interests which are confidentiality and public policy. On the one
hand, there is a contractual relationship between parties and arbitrators not to disclose
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information about the tribunal, especially documents. Confidentiality has different
application among different legal systems. The English courts, for example, accept an
absolute confidentiality while the Australian courts prefer the restricted confidentiality that
does not contradict with public policy. On the other hand, arbitrators must make sure that
awards do not breach public policy of countries. Indeed, competent states would not allow
awards to breach public policy, yet there are different levels of public policy, domestic,
international and transnational public policy.
All of the above discussed issues drive me to say that there is no legal duty to report
corruption upon international arbitrators no matter how serious corruption is. In my opinion,
there are many obstacles prevent issuing such a duty. First of all, there are no clear articles
about arbitrators’ duty on national and international systems. Second, industrialized countries
would manipulate such article to pass interests of their citizens and corporation against
consumer countries. Moreover, there are examples where national courts such as the English
courts did not report corruption to competent states such as Soleimany and Westcare cases,
and an example where the Kenyan government did not prosecute the ex-president although it
knows. Therefore, it would be unfair step to formulate legal obligation upon international
arbitrators to report where no real political desire of states exists to fight corruption. In my
opinion, issuing the nullity and void is a brave step by international arbitrators to fight alone
corrupted governments, and it is the only solution for illegal contracts in the absence of laws.
Yet, some wonder if arbitrators will report corruption in the future.
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